



MICH 2000

Ukraine's SBU Alpha Deep-Strike One-Way Attack UAV

DATE

20 September 2026

GEOGRAPHIC AREA

Ukraine / Russia

INTELLIGENCE DOMAIN

Unmanned Systems / Long-Range Strike

Executive Summary

The MICH 2000 is a Ukrainian long-range one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV) publicly identified on 12 August 2026 after more than a year of appearances in strike footage. Ukrainian reporting associates the system with the Security Service of Ukraine's Special Operations Centre Alpha. Its flying-wing planform, small forward canards, rear propeller and rocket-assisted launch are visible in open-source imagery.

Manufacturer material states a range of up to 2,000 km, a selectable 25-60 kg combat section and a basic price of about USD 48,000. These are claims, not independently verified performance data. Publicly available information does not establish dimensions, speed, endurance, ceiling, take-off weight or accuracy. The catalogue's eight configurations should not be treated as eight confirmed MICH 2000 variants.

The programme illustrates a Ukrainian wartime adaptation pathway: initial acquisition of a foreign airframe, rapid testing, localisation of production and subsequent modification of electronics and launch equipment. The system's operational significance is plausible, but its production scale and attribution to specific high-value strikes remain constrained by dependence on manufacturer and SBU-linked reporting.

The Situation

The public development history begins in late 2023, when a Ukrainian UAV team acquired eight Chinese ZTK-150 aircraft after attempts to obtain production technology failed. A 2024 test campaign exposed an initial weight-balance problem, propeller vibration that reportedly caused a propeller to detach during a later test, and vulnerability to electronic warfare. By the end of summer 2024, the team had taken over airframe production and was experimenting with new electronics. The first reported combat mission took place in October 2024.

Ukrainian reporting describes the MICH as a configurable strike family. The manufacturer offers analogue, digital or Starlink communications, optional terminal correction and CRPA-based GNSS protection by configuration. Public sources do not identify the terminal sensor or method, nor do they establish which options are fitted to operational airframes.



Figure 1. MICH 2000 on a launch rail; image retained from the source report.

Capabilities and Configuration

The clearest recognition signature is the combination of a delta or flying-wing planform with small forward canards; canards alone are not distinctive. Imagery supports a rear-mounted propeller and booster-assisted launch. Domestic booster production was developed after reported problems with externally supplied boosters. Both black and light-painted airframes appear in the source imagery.

The communications options indicate alternative command or mission architectures, but their availability does not establish that every aircraft maintains a continuous data link in flight. CRPA antennas are intended

to improve satellite-navigation reception under jamming. Optional terminal guidance could improve final approach accuracy, but the sensor, processing chain and conditions for employment are not publicly established.

Production Economics

The manufacturer states a basic price of approximately USD 48,000, with final cost depending on options. It also claims capacity of roughly 6,000 aircraft annually and an objective of 10,000. These figures describe stated capacity and plans, not verified production or deliveries. Claimed local content reaches up to 85 per cent by value without a CRPA antenna and about 55 per cent with one; the CRPA is reported to cost USD 20,000-25,000 depending on configuration.

The price and localisation claims suggest an effort to make the system expendable at scale while limiting exposure to foreign supply constraints. The cost comparison is incomplete without data on the warhead, launcher, communications package, navigation aids, support equipment and replacement rate. Installed capacity alone does not establish operational availability: component supply, quality control, trained crews, launch equipment and command approval all affect sortie generation.

Operational Record

Ukrainian journalists reported identifying the MICH in at least eight videos showing Shahed-like strike aircraft. Separately, the manufacturer claims that Alpha has launched thousands of MICH aircraft against hundreds of targets. Public evidence does not independently confirm that scale, and several events cited by the manufacturer as MICH strikes are confirmed as attacks but not as MICH engagements.

The source report associates the Engels-2 Tu-95MS event with confirmed damage but attributes the weapon to the manufacturer alone; the weapon used was not independently identified. A strike on the Wildberries hub in Ryazan is confirmed, while MICH attribution remains unverified. Repeated strikes at Ust-Luga are confirmed and Alpha presence has been reported, but the MICH count and dates are unresolved. A claimed anti-Starlink electronic-warfare strike at Gelendzhik has no located corroboration and should be treated as unverified.

What It Means

A long-range airframe with a modest stated payload can threaten fixed infrastructure at operational depth if navigation, mission planning and launch access are reliable. The flying-wing configuration and booster launch provide a recognisable visual pattern, but open-source material is insufficient to establish radar signature, flight profile or interception difficulty. The stated range and payload combination, if achieved in service, would allow route selection and dispersed launch locations; it would not by itself demonstrate precision or repeatable effects.

A dedicated intelligence-service operator may support target development and specialised missioning, but public information does not describe the command-and-control chain, sortie rates or integration with other Ukrainian strike systems. Similarly, configurable communications and navigation aids imply options for contested environments, while the 2024 test history underscores continuing exposure to electronic warfare and component reliability.

What to Watch Next

The most useful indicators are independently geolocated MICH imagery; repeated observations that distinguish production configurations; recoverable debris or intact components; and evidence linking a specific aircraft to a documented strike. Photogrammetry could help establish span, length and launcher geometry. Engine, navigation, CRPA and terminal-guidance components would clarify the actual technical baseline.

Production claims should be tested against observable deliveries, launch activity, component supply and sustained operational tempo. Changes in communications equipment, navigation protection, booster design or launch procedures would indicate adaptation. Strike claims against high-value targets require independent weapon attribution before they can be used to estimate accuracy or operational effectiveness.

Visual Reference Sheet


The source sheet presents recognition features, production and launch imagery, and reported sightings. It is retained without treating its captions or map as independent verification.

INTELLIGENCE WORLD | REFERENCE SHEET

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MICH 2000

Open-source photo and footage references



Key recognition features: flying-wing airframe, small forward canards, pusher propulsion, launch booster, black or light-painted production variants.

Source basis: open-source imagery referenced from Ukrainian reporting and associated visual material.

Figure 2. MICH 2000 open-source visual reference sheet from the source report.

Overall Assessment

The MICH 2000 is a relevant Ukrainian long-range strike programme with a visible development path, a dedicated reported operator and a potentially useful combination of range, configurable communications and a comparatively low stated unit price. The strongest evidence concerns its airframe configuration and reported programme history. Range, payload, production scale and strike attribution remain primarily manufacturer-derived and are not independently established.

The system should therefore be assessed as a credible capability whose practical value depends on production delivery, mission reliability, navigation resilience and the ability to generate repeatable sorties. Until those factors and specific weapon-to-target links are corroborated, claims of mass employment or decisive effects remain unverified.

Methodological Note

This analysis is based on open-source reporting and visual material available as of 20 September 2026. Manufacturer claims remain subject to independent verification. The visual reference sheet is retained from the source report as a recognition aid; its captions and mapped sightings are not treated as independent confirmation of performance or strike attribution. No later developments are incorporated.