



Russia's Force Expansion

Personnel ceilings, wartime regeneration and
the NATO factor

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GEOGRAPHIC AREA

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Executive Summary

On 28 September, President Vladimir Putin raised Russia's authorised armed-forces establishment to 2,441,630 positions, including 1,550,500 military personnel. The revision adds 15,500 military posts to the ceiling set in July. It is the fourth upward adjustment in 2026; taken together, the year's revisions add 50,500 authorised service-member positions against the previous baseline.

The decree is a measure of authorised strength, not a report of personnel actually present, trained or available for deployment. It neither orders mobilisation nor assigns new formations to a theatre. Its clearest immediate significance is institutional: Moscow is continuing to enlarge the authorised force structure and directs the government to provide the necessary federal funding. That supports a larger wartime establishment, but does not by itself demonstrate a new offensive or an intended extension of the war to NATO territory.

NATO's higher defence plans form part of Russia's strategic environment and may influence long-term force planning. The decree itself, however, cites no NATO-related rationale. The direct causal link is therefore unproven. The more immediate explanation is a continuing effort to sustain and reorganise a force engaged in a prolonged war, while preparing capacity for future requirements.

Key Points

1. The authorised military ceiling rises by 15,500, to 1,550,500; the overall authorised establishment reaches 2,441,630. These are establishment figures, not verified headcount or deployable strength.
2. Repeated increases in 2026 indicate that the larger wartime force is being institutionalised. The scale and composition of each revision matter: the July change was publicly linked to military construction units, not solely to frontline combat formations.
3. The order is not evidence of a fresh mobilisation, a decision to widen the Ukraine war, or preparations for an attack on NATO. Such judgments require corroborating indicators of recruitment, unit formation, training, equipment and deployment.

The Situation

Decree No. 700, signed on 28 September, sets the authorised establishment at 2,441,630, of whom 1,550,500 are servicemen. It directs the government to allocate federal funds to the Ministry of Defence and takes effect on signature. The measure replaces the June decree as amended in July.

The change is modest in isolation: 15,500 military posts are about one per cent of the 1,535,000 ceiling set in July. The cumulative 2026 revisions add 50,500 service-member positions and 52,500 positions overall relative to the preceding authorised establishment. This pattern is more informative than the latest increment alone: Moscow has repeatedly adjusted the legal ceiling rather than announcing a single mass expansion.

The increase should be read within the existing war and force-reorganisation cycle. In July, the preceding 25,000-person military increase was reported as connected to the creation of military construction units. This is a useful caution against treating every rise in the establishment as an equivalent addition to combat troops. The September decree gives no comparable breakdown of the new posts.

2026 Authorised-Strength Adjustments




Figure 1. The authorised military-personnel ceiling rose by 50,500 over the four 2026 adjustments. These are establishment figures, not filled posts or deployable strength.

Authorised Strength and Available Combat Power

An authorised establishment defines the number of positions the state permits its armed forces to maintain. It does not establish how many positions are filled, how many personnel are fit for duty, or how many can be concentrated in a specific operational direction. The total figure also includes positions beyond the military-personnel subtotal; the two numbers are not interchangeable.

Conversion of a larger ceiling into operational power requires recruits or transfers, training capacity, officers and non-commissioned officers, equipment, accommodation, maintenance and logistics. New personnel assigned to support, engineering, administration or training functions may improve endurance without increasing the number of manoeuvre battalions immediately available at the front. The decree provides no unit list, readiness data, force-generation schedule or geographic allocation.

Accordingly, the order is a leading indicator of institutional intent, not a measure of current force generation. Its operational value will depend on whether the posts are funded and filled, what functions they serve, and whether the personnel can be trained and equipped without drawing resources from existing formations.

Force Generation and Sustainability

Russia has continued to rely on contract recruitment alongside conscription and other personnel channels. Deputy Security Council chairman Dmitry Medvedev said 422,704 people signed contracts with the armed forces in 2025, compared with about 450,000 in 2024; he separately reported 32,000 volunteers joining volunteer brigades. These are official Russian figures reported by Reuters, not an independently audited count. Contract signings are gross entries: they do not show net force growth after casualties, discharges, medical evacuation, transfers or training attrition.

The September decree's funding clause matters because the ceiling is not self-executing in practical terms. Pay, recruitment incentives, training, housing and support functions compete with procurement, replenishment and maintenance for resources. Reuters reported that draft budget documents put 2027 defence spending at 17.1 trillion roubles, 27 per cent above the figure initially budgeted for that year, while also describing pressure on the wider budget. This supports the view that Moscow is planning for sustained defence expenditure; it does not show that the increase is earmarked for the additional personnel posts.

A larger establishment can serve several functions at once: replace losses, stabilise understrength units, expand support and training organisations, or create room for new formations. The available decree does not identify

which function predominates. It is therefore more defensible to assess the change as force-generation capacity being formalised than to infer a specific order of battle or operational plan.

The NATO Factor

NATO Allies have committed to reach defence and security-related investment of five per cent of GDP by 2035, including at least 3.5 per cent for core defence requirements. The commitment, announced at The Hague in 2025, establishes a long-term planning horizon rather than an immediate increase in deployed forces.

That trajectory is relevant to Russian threat perception and future force design. It may reinforce Moscow's case for maintaining a larger standing establishment, improving mobilisation capacity and expanding support structures. Yet the 28 September decree contains no reference to NATO, allied deployments or a new external threat. Timing alone cannot establish that NATO pressure triggered this particular adjustment.

The causal sequence is also reciprocal. NATO's post-2022 investment decisions are publicly framed as responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the resulting threat to Allied security; Moscow can in turn cite NATO rearmament to justify further expansion. The same development can therefore reinforce both sides' threat assessments without revealing the original or proximate motive behind an individual personnel decree.

What It Means

In the near term, the additional 15,500 authorised posts are too small and too poorly specified to be treated as proof of a new operational surge. The decree does not state that the positions will be filled immediately, nor that they will form new combat units. It is not a mobilisation order and does not change the legal or operational status of conscripts by itself.

Over a longer horizon, repeated increases can give the Ministry of Defence greater room to sustain a force larger than its pre-war establishment, absorb support requirements and establish additional formations if personnel and equipment become available. This increases potential capacity, but the conversion chain remains decisive: recruitment, training, command-and-control integration, equipment, logistics and deployment must align. A larger paper establishment without those enablers may add administrative burden more quickly than combat power.

The most plausible interpretation is continuity and institutionalisation of wartime force generation, with a secondary signal that Moscow intends to preserve options beyond the current campaign. A deliberate extension of the conflict remains possible as a future policy choice, but the decree provides no evidence that such a decision has been taken. A NATO-directed military expansion is still less directly supported by the text.

Possible Force-Development Pathways

The first and most immediately consistent pathway is force sustainment: filling authorised posts to replace departures, stabilise understrength formations and improve rotation. If this is the main purpose, the measure would increase endurance in the existing war without necessarily producing a larger deployable force at any one time.

A second pathway is expansion of enabling functions. Engineering and construction units, logistics, maintenance, medical support, training and command organisations can increase the force's capacity to generate and sustain combat power. The July precedent shows why the military-personnel subtotal cannot automatically be equated with new frontline strength. Such expansion can still have operational effect over time by reducing bottlenecks and allowing combat formations to remain in the field longer.

A third pathway would be formation of additional combat units or a larger reserve for future operations. That outcome would require identifiable personnel flows, training cadres, equipment, collective training and sustained logistics. The September decree establishes none of these. A wider conflict, including a direct military confrontation with NATO, would require additional political and operational decisions; the new ceiling alone does not indicate that they have been made.

What to Watch Next

Recruitment and retention: published contract targets, regional signing bonuses, conscription rules, mobilisation legislation and evidence that recruitment is keeping pace with losses and separations.

Unit formation: orders establishing named formations, renewed manning tables, officer assignments, training cycles and the transfer of equipment from storage or existing units.

Geographic posture: sustained movement of personnel, equipment and logistics infrastructure toward Ukraine or NATO-facing military districts. Isolated exercises or announcements should be distinguished from persistent deployment changes.

Implementation: budget execution, recruitment totals, accommodation and training capacity, and evidence that the new posts are filled. These indicators will show whether the decree is being converted into usable force.

Escalation indicators: a separate mobilisation order, materially larger call-up quotas, forward deployment of newly formed units, or a sustained logistics build-up would carry more weight for assessing a wider conflict than an establishment ceiling alone.

Overall Assessment

The 28 September decree raises Russia's authorised military establishment by 15,500 positions and continues a series of increases made during 2026. It signals that Moscow is preserving and formalising a larger force structure while directing funding to support it. The measure is consistent with long-term force regeneration and the demands of a protracted war; it does not establish the size, readiness or deployment of the force that will result.

The decree alone does not demonstrate imminent mobilisation, a decision to widen the war, or a response directly triggered by NATO. The principal judgment would change if the authorised increase were followed by new mobilisation measures, funded and manned combat formations, or sustained forward deployment. Confidence is high on the authorised figures, moderate on the institutionalisation of force generation, and low on the decree's proximate motive and its eventual operational effect.

Methodological Note

This open-source assessment distinguishes the legal authorised establishment from actual personnel strength and deployable combat power. Exact figures are drawn from the decree text and corroborating reporting.

Recruitment and budget figures are attributed to the officials or documents from which they were reported; they are not treated as independent measures of net force growth. Judgments about force generation and NATO-related motives are analytical inferences, not stated rationales in Decree No. 700. Information cut-off: 29 September 2026.