INTELLIGENCE WORLD

ISSUE 001 / 2026

Weekly Threat Assessment and Forecast Matrix

REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Ten regional theatres | One matrix per area

Reporting period: 20–26 November 2026 | Event cutoff: 26 Nov, 23:59 UTC
Forecast period: 27 November–3 December 2026

Regional RCW ratings and trends: 26 November 2026.
Sector assessments compare the two reporting windows; gaps remain explicit.


Geopolitics & Strategic Affairs Team

Comparative assessment: 13–19 vs 20–26 November 2026

REGIONAL OVERVIEW MAP

REPORTING PERIOD 20–26 NOVEMBER 2026 | FORECAST 27 NOVEMBER–3 DECEMBER 2026

10 Europe	01 Black Sea	08 South Caucasus	07 Taiwan Strait–Western Pacific	09 Korean Peninsula
Severe Crisis	Critical	Tension	Severe Crisis	Elevated Crisis
↑ Worsening	↑ Worsening	→ Stable	↑ Worsening	↑ Worsening



04 Sahel	02 Eastern Mediterranean	03 Red Sea–Bab el-Mandeb–Gulf of Aden	05 Horn of Africa	06 Persian Gulf–Strait of Hormuz
Critical	Severe Crisis	Critical	Critical	Critical
↑ Worsening	↑ Worsening	↑ Worsening	↑ Worsening	↑ Worsening

Land shading follows selected country boundaries; maritime limits and geographic coverage are indicative.
Overall levels and trends reproduce the approved RCW assessment dated 26 November; they are not weekly sector trends.

Base geography: Natural Earth, 1:110m (public domain). Illustrative country selection; boundaries do not imply political recognition.

BLACK SEA

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Critical	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Critical / Worsening. Reported attacks on grain vessels and continued infrastructure strikes sustain exposure; maritime attribution and logistics throughput remain uncertain.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Military Operations	**Severe Crisis**	→ Stable	Russian strikes affected Ukrainian cities and infrastructure in both periods. Attacks continued on 25–26 November, but comparable regional totals are unavailable.	Further strike activity is likely. The geographical scope of operations cannot be established from the available reporting.	Likely	Moderate
Maritime Security	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	Ukraine reported attacks on two grain ships near Odesa on 26 November. Earlier bridge and vessel incidents add persistent exposure; damage and attribution remain incomplete.	Shipping exposure is likely to persist. A wider disruption would require evidence of additional incidents or restrictions.	Likely	Low
Air & Missile Activity	**Severe Crisis**	→ Stable	Missile and UAV strikes continued across both weeks, including the night of 25–26 November. The regional breakdown and interceptor endurance remain unclear.	Additional attacks are likely to maintain pressure on air defence. Interceptor availability and attack composition remain uncertain.	Likely	Moderate
Political & Strategic Developments	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Regional defence coordination remained on the agenda on 25 November. Implementation of new measures and their effect on maritime security are not established.	Regional defence coordination is likely to continue. Implementation of any new measures remains unverified.	Likely	Moderate
Critical Infrastructure	**Severe Crisis**	→ Stable	Odesa energy infrastructure was struck in both periods. Further disruption was reported on 25–26 November; repair capacity and restoration times remain uncertain.	Local electricity disruption is likely to persist as repairs proceed. Restoration timelines remain uncertain.	Likely	Moderate
External Military Involvement	**Tension**	– Not assessed	European defence authorities reiterated support for Ukraine and regional coordination. New deployed capabilities or a change in sustainment were not established.	External security cooperation is likely to persist. A change in deployed force strength is not forecast.	Likely	Moderate

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

New verified ship incidents; outage duration; official strike reports; deconfliction statements.

INFORMATION GAPS

Kerch rail and alternative-route throughput, port recovery, ship damage and attack attribution; comparable incident totals and interceptor endurance.

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Severe Crisis	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Severe Crisis / Worsening. Gaza and Syria incidents sustain cross-front exposure; Libya maritime security and southern Lebanon remain concerns.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Military Operations	**Severe Crisis**	→ Stable	Israeli strikes persisted, including Gaza on 26 November. Syria attributed a Hasaka attack on 25 November to Islamic State; attribution remains unconfirmed.	Further localized strikes are likely. The evidence does not establish an imminent region-wide expansion.	Likely	Moderate
Naval Posture	**Elevated Crisis**	↑ Worsening	Libyan authorities reported vessel damage on 22 November; Kyiv claimed responsibility. The incident does not establish a change in fleet readiness.	The incident is likely to prompt a review of maritime security. Changes in deployment cannot yet be forecast reliably.	Likely	Low
Territorial Disputes	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Earlier maritime notices concerned the Greece–Cyprus cable. Reported resolution does not establish renewed survey work or a durable agreement.	Jurisdictional friction is likely to remain relevant. Renewed interference with surveys is not established.	Likely	Low
Political Stability	**Elevated Crisis**	↑ Worsening	Libyan military authorities threatened retaliation over the vessel incident. Gaza and Syria face separate pressures; coordinated escalation is unproven.	Localized political and security tensions are likely to persist. Wider institutional consequences remain uncertain.	Likely	Low
Energy Security	**Tension**	– Not assessed	The Greece–Cyprus interconnector remains exposed to jurisdictional friction. No verified change in physical energy supply or survey completion was obtained.	Project-related diplomatic friction is likely to persist. No physical energy interruption is specifically forecast.	Likely	Low
External Military Involvement	**Elevated Crisis**	↑ Worsening	The 22 November vessel incident exposed Russian-linked maritime support activity in Libya. Its effect on logistics or deployed strength remains unverified.	Russian support activity is likely to remain a regional security concern. Actual changes in logistics require corroboration.	Likely	Low

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Gaza strike reporting; verified damage to vessels; defence cooperation decisions; maritime advisories.

INFORMATION GAPS

Lebanese strike effects, Syrian network capacity, Gaza target and casualty status; vessel damage and Russian support logistics.

RED SEA–BAB EL-MANDEB–GULF OF ADEN

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Critical	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Critical / Worsening. Hodeidah operations, threats to Saudi ports and the reported 26 November refinery strike increase infrastructure and supply exposure.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Maritime Security	**Elevated Crisis**	↑ Worsening	Threats against Saudi Red Sea ports followed renewed coalition operations. Commercial shipping faces sustained exposure; an attack on every threatened port is not established.	Maritime exposure is likely to remain elevated. A verified attack would materially change the assessment.	Likely	Moderate
Missile & UAV Threat	**Critical**	↑ Worsening	Cross-border strikes continued in both weeks. Saudi authorities reported fresh interceptions and a strike on a Jazan refinery on 26 November; full effects remain unclear.	Further cross-border attacks and interceptions are likely. Their scale and effectiveness remain uncertain.	Likely	Moderate
Naval Operations	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	EU defence authorities reviewed the ASPIDES shipping-protection mission on 25 November. Deployed force availability and coverage remain unquantified.	Protective naval activity is likely to continue. Its coverage and effectiveness cannot be quantified.	Likely	Moderate
Armed Groups	**Severe Crisis**	↑ Worsening	A Yemeni official reported Houthi advances towards Aden on 24 November. Coalition strikes add pressure; territorial changes remain unverified.	Further confrontation is likely, including pressure around Aden. Changes in territorial control or port access require independent confirmation.	Likely	Moderate
Port Security	**Critical**	↑ Worsening	The coalition reported Hodeidah strikes on 25 November; Saudi authorities reported a Jazan refinery strike on 26 November. Full effects remain unclear.	Further pressure on ports and associated infrastructure is likely. Sustained closure or quantified throughput losses are not established.	Likely	Moderate
Commercial Shipping	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	Southern Red Sea traffic was reported below usual levels in the earlier assessment. Current comparable transit counts remain unavailable; threats alone do not establish closure.	Shipping uncertainty is likely to persist. A quantified change in activity cannot be forecast without fresh traffic data.	Likely	Low

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Confirmed port damage; shipping alerts; independent strike reports; commercial transit counts; official ceasefire statements.

INFORMATION GAPS

Coastal control, port throughput, verified damage and demonstrated targeting capacity; comparable shipping and interception data.

SAHEL

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Critical	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Critical / Worsening on its established baseline. Attacks in Mali on 21 November reinforce civilian exposure; fresh regional coverage remains incomplete.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Terrorism & Insurgency	Severe Crisis	– Not assessed	Violence against communities and transit routes continued; attacks in Mali occurred on 21 November. Comparable full-week incident data for the central Sahel remain incomplete.	Militant violence is likely to continue. Weekly attack totals and the relative contribution of drone use remain uncertain.	Likely	Moderate
Military Operations	Elevated Crisis	– Not assessed	Government counter-insurgency operations remain active. Current force availability, route reopening and territorial-control changes are insufficiently corroborated.	Security operations are likely to continue. Their results cannot be assessed in the absence of corroborated reporting.	Likely	Low
Political Stability	Elevated Crisis	– Not assessed	Insurgent pressure near Bamako was reported through 20 November. Local governance changes and Niger's review of protest rules remain unresolved.	Governance-related tensions are likely to persist. The outcome of Niger's scheduled council discussion remains uncertain.	Likely	Low
Border Security	Elevated Crisis	– Not assessed	Threats to routes linking Burkina Faso with Ghana and Togo were reported through 20 November. Full-week coverage is inadequate to establish new geographical spread.	Cross-border insecurity is likely to persist. The extent of further geographical spread cannot be reliably estimated.	Likely	Low
Foreign Military Presence	Elevated Crisis	– Not assessed	Reporting published on 19 November described increased Russian military strike activity in Mali. Current deployed strength and operational availability are uncertain.	Russian military involvement is likely to persist. A further expansion in force strength is not established.	Likely	Moderate
Civilian Security	Severe Crisis	– Not assessed	Attacks in Mali on 21 November affected civilians and damaged the Niono health facility. Regional displacement and service-access data remain incomplete.	Humanitarian exposure is likely to remain significant. Additional displacement would depend on the location and intensity of fighting.	Likely	Moderate

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Confirmed incidents; civilian displacement; government security releases; independent reports of foreign force changes.

INFORMATION GAPS

Fresh Burkina Faso and Niger coverage, territorial control, force availability, route access, and comparable full-week incident totals.

HORN OF AFRICA

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Critical	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Critical / Worsening. Disputed northern Ethiopian border developments and reported Blue Nile attacks sustain escalation and civilian-security concerns.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Armed Conflict	**Severe Crisis**	↑ Worsening	Clashes in northern Ethiopia on 21–22 November remain disputed. Reported attacks in Sudan's Blue Nile on 24 November add civilian exposure.	Localized fighting is likely to continue. Further civilian displacement is a significant concern.	Likely	Moderate
Terrorism & Insurgency	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	US military reporting on 19 November concerned operations on 13–15 November. Current-week insurgent activity in Somalia is incompletely observed.	Insurgent activity is likely to remain a security concern. Changes in weekly intensity cannot be assessed.	Likely	Low
Interstate Tensions	**Elevated Crisis**	↑ Worsening	Border clashes followed earlier force concentrations. Regional security contacts were reported on 21 November; control changes remain disputed.	Border tension is likely to persist. Available reporting is insufficient to establish an imminent interstate conflict.	Likely	Low
Maritime Security	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Armed approaches to shipping were reported on 17 and 20 November. Maritime exposure persists; an updated comparable incident and traffic series was not obtained.	Piracy exposure and maritime surveillance are likely to remain relevant. A new hijacking is not specifically forecast.	Likely	Moderate
Political Stability	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	Displacement and service disruption persist in Sudan. Findings on Tigray published on 23 November concern earlier events, not fresh shelling.	Conflict-related governance pressures are likely to persist. New political arrangements cannot be predicted from this evidence.	Likely	Moderate
Foreign Military Presence	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	US military reporting covers strikes on 13–15 November. EU authorities reviewed maritime operations on 25 November; force availability remains unknown.	External security operations are likely to continue. Changes in force availability remain unverified.	Likely	Moderate

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Independent fighting reports; official border statements; displacement updates; AFRICOM releases; piracy warnings.

INFORMATION GAPS

Competing border-control claims, force readiness, current Somalia ground picture, Blue Nile damage and regional displacement.

PERSIAN GULF–STRAIT OF HORMUZ

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Critical	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Critical / Worsening. A nearby explosion reported by a tanker adds maritime concern; no damage, common attacker or new full closure is established.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Maritime Security	**Severe Crisis**	↑ Worsening	A 25 November warning recorded an explosion near a tanker west of Dubai; no damage was reported. Attribution and links to earlier incidents remain unproven.	Serious maritime insecurity is likely to persist. Attribution of additional incidents will remain critical to the assessment.	Likely	Moderate
Military Posture	**Elevated Crisis**	→ Stable	Naval pressure and passage restrictions persisted in the reviewed maritime advisories. Evidence does not establish a quantified change in deployed force readiness.	Competing military postures are likely to persist. A major change in deployment is not established.	Likely	Moderate
Missile & UAV Threat	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	Missile and UAV concerns persist across the Gulf. Current-week launch and interception totals are incomplete; the wider force posture cannot be inferred.	Regional strike exposure is likely to persist. The intensity of attacks cannot be estimated without a comparable incident series.	Likely	Low
Regional Tensions	**Severe Crisis**	→ Stable	Tehran reiterated its conditions on 25 November amid passage restrictions. No implemented settlement or verified return to normal traffic is established.	Shipping-related political confrontation is likely to continue. A verified diplomatic agreement would change the outlook.	Likely	Moderate
Energy Security	**Severe Crisis**	– Not assessed	Maritime advisories indicate continued disruption to traffic. Assisted transit counts from earlier partial windows are not directly comparable with full-week throughput.	Energy transport disruption is likely to persist. Current throughput and price effects cannot be quantified from this collection.	Likely	Moderate
External Military Involvement	**Elevated Crisis**	→ Stable	US enforcement and regional naval activity were documented in both periods. A verified change in external deployments or force availability was not established.	Continued external military involvement is likely. Actual changes in force posture require official confirmation.	Likely	Low

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Verified maritime incident notices; independent attribution; traffic reports; official statements on restrictions or negotiations.

INFORMATION GAPS

Mine and explosion attribution, damage, current transit baseline, weapons availability and external force posture.

TAIWAN STRAIT–WESTERN PACIFIC

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Severe Crisis	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Severe Crisis / Worsening. Local aircraft and ship detections diverge; neither series alone establishes intent, readiness or a blockade.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Air Operations	**Tension**	↓ Improving	Reported aircraft detections fell from 60 to 46 across daily bulletins dated 13–19 and 20–26 November. This indicates lower local air activity, not improved strategic readiness.	Further PLA air activity is likely. The observed variability does not establish a sustained increase in operational tempo.	Likely	Moderate
Naval Operations	**Tension**	↑ Worsening	Reported PLAN ship sightings rose from 50 to 60 over the same bulletin dates. Local maritime pressure increased; repeated sightings do not identify unique hulls.	Continued naval presence is likely. Available evidence does not demonstrate the implementation of a blockade.	Likely	Moderate
Amphibious Posture	**Not assessed**	– Not assessed	Earlier regional training reporting does not establish current amphibious lift or force readiness. No corroborated change in operational posture was obtained.	No directional amphibious forecast is supported. A specific change requires corroborated readiness and deployment evidence.	Not assessed	Not assessed
Military Exercises	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Taiwan reported a joint PLA patrol on 21 November. Comparable exercise coverage across the two reporting windows is insufficient to establish a trend.	Further military signalling is likely. A named new exercise or its timing cannot be established.	Likely	Moderate
Hybrid Activities	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Taiwan reported suspected China-linked information activity on 20 November ahead of local elections. Comparable incident totals and effectiveness are unavailable.	Information interference concerns are likely to persist through the 28 November elections. The outcome or effectiveness cannot be inferred.	Likely	Moderate
Regional Military Posture	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Russian aircraft activity was reported on 19 November. Current coordinated force changes or sustained changes in readiness remain unverified.	Regional military signalling is likely to persist. A broader coordinated operation is not established by these reports.	Likely	Low

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Taiwan MND daily releases; announced exercises; independently confirmed incidents; official regional security statements.

INFORMATION GAPS

Mission profiles, amphibious lift, logistics, readiness, intent and persistence; daily sightings are not unique hulls.

SOUTH CAUCASUS

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Tension	→ Stable	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Tension / Stable. Renewed civil-society contacts support dialogue but do not establish implemented border or legal arrangements.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Border Security	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Border delimitation remains a stated bilateral priority. Current implementation and comparable border-incident coverage remain incomplete; no new clash was corroborated.	Border delimitation is likely to remain on the diplomatic agenda. No immediate security outcome can be established.	Likely	Moderate
Military Posture	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Azerbaijan reported continued multinational and staff training. No corroborated change in operational deployment or mobilisation is established.	Military training and cooperation are likely to remain relevant. No significant force mobilisation is specifically forecast.	Likely	Moderate
Political & Diplomatic Developments	**Tension**	↓ Improving	Armenia presented a constitutional proposal on 23 November; dialogue resumed on 26 November. Neither establishes legal adoption or treaty implementation.	Diplomatic engagement is likely to continue. A signed and implemented peace agreement is not yet established.	Likely	Moderate
External Influence	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Multinational training and diplomatic engagement remain relevant. No verified change in foreign force presence or military assistance is established.	External defence and diplomatic engagement is likely to continue. Changes in foreign force presence remain unverified.	Likely	Moderate
Strategic Infrastructure	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Transport connectivity remains part of bilateral negotiations and wider regional discussion. Physical implementation and security guarantees are not established.	Connectivity discussions are likely to continue. Physical implementation within the forecast period is not established.	Likely	Moderate
Regional Stability	**Tension**	↓ Improving	The constitutional proposal and renewed dialogue support the peace process. Border arrangements and the final legal settlement remain unresolved.	Political dialogue is likely to remain the principal observable development. A durable security settlement remains uncertain.	Likely	Moderate

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Official treaty milestones; border commission outcomes; verified border incidents; constitutional process; transit agreements.

INFORMATION GAPS

Local force posture, Georgian developments, border incident coverage, ratification and implementation of connectivity arrangements.

KOREAN PENINSULA

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Elevated Crisis	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Elevated Crisis / Worsening. Russian KADIZ activity and North Korean nuclear signalling sustain concern; current ground and missile posture is incompletely observed.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Missile Activity	**Tension**	– Not assessed	North Korea reported an earlier missile-related drill on 4 November. No current-week launch was corroborated in the available collection.	Missile-related security concerns are likely to persist. No specific launch is forecast for the coming week.	Likely	Low
Nuclear Developments	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	North Korea's leader reportedly visited nuclear facilities on 25 November and called for expanded tactical roles. Output and readiness remain unknown.	Further nuclear-related signalling is likely. A specific test or deployment change in the forecast period cannot be reliably established.	Likely	Low
Ground Forces Posture	**Not assessed**	– Not assessed	Earlier border mine allegations and conflicting official statements remain context. Current ground-force readiness and deployment changes are not established.	No directional ground posture forecast is supported. Comparable force and incident reporting is required.	Not assessed	Not assessed
Air & Naval Activity	**Elevated Crisis**	↑ Worsening	Seoul reported Russian KADIZ entries on 17, 18 and 24 November. The latest close approach prompted a response, without territorial airspace violation.	Airspace-related vigilance is likely to persist. A new airspace violation is not specifically forecast.	Likely	Moderate
Military Exercises	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Earlier US–ROK exercise activity was documented in October. A current comparable schedule and evidence of readiness gains are unavailable.	Combined readiness activity is likely to remain relevant. A specific exercise during the forecast period is not established.	Likely	Low
Interstate Tensions	**Tension**	– Not assessed	Pyongyang reiterated its nuclear policy on 26 November; Seoul expressed concern. Diplomatic contacts have not yielded a verified substantive change.	Diplomatic uncertainty is likely to persist. A substantive policy shift would require direct official confirmation.	Likely	Low

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Official airspace reports; missile launch notices; nuclear-related statements; exercise announcements; diplomatic releases.

INFORMATION GAPS

Current missile and nuclear operational posture, ground readiness, technical air-defence performance and intent.

EUROPE

REPORTING PERIOD	OVERALL RCW LEVEL	RCW TREND · 26 NOV	FORECAST PERIOD
20–26 November 2026	Severe Crisis	↑ Worsening	27 Nov–3 Dec 2026

KEY JUDGEMENT

RCW retains Severe Crisis / Worsening. Continuing strikes on Ukraine sustain infrastructure, air-defence and repair pressures; direct NATO–Russia combat is not established.

THREAT DOMAIN	CURRENT LEVEL	TREND	ACTIVE CONCERNS	FORECAST	PROBABILITY	CONFIDENCE
Military Posture	**Tension**	→ Stable	Allied exercise activity continued; NATO began a readiness exercise on 24 November. Announced activity does not establish an increase in usable force readiness.	Continued exercise activity is likely. Results cannot be inferred from the announcement of its commencement.	Likely	Moderate
NATO–Russia Tensions	**Elevated Crisis**	↑ Worsening	Moldovan and Polish aerial incidents were reported on 17 and 19–20 November. Strikes in Ukraine sustain spillover exposure; no direct NATO–Russia combat is established.	NATO–Russia tensions are likely to persist. The evidence does not establish an imminent direct confrontation.	Likely	Moderate
Hybrid Threats	**Tension**	– Not assessed	A Polish intelligence official warned that sabotage risks could outlast a Ukraine peace agreement. The warning is not evidence of a new attributed incident.	Hybrid security concerns are likely to persist. Specific new incidents or attribution cannot be forecast from this statement.	Likely	Low
Airspace Security	**Elevated Crisis**	– Not assessed	Aerial incidents were reported across both windows. A comparable regional incident rate or a new direct attack on NATO is not established.	Airspace security concerns are likely to persist near affected borders. Further incursions cannot be forecast individually.	Likely	Moderate
Critical Infrastructure	**Elevated Crisis**	→ Stable	Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure persisted across both windows. The 25–26 November attacks sustained pressure on power supply and repairs.	Further pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure is likely. Kyiv's warning of another major strike does not establish its timing or scope.	Likely	Moderate
Defence Readiness	**Tension**	→ Stable	Allied training continued; a NATO exercise began on 24 November. Results and demonstrated readiness improvements remain unavailable.	Readiness testing is likely to continue. Actual capability gains cannot be established until results are available.	Likely	Moderate

INDICATORS TO MONITOR

Official NATO exercise reports; verified airspace incidents; sanctions decisions; infrastructure incident investigations.

INFORMATION GAPS

Interceptor endurance, force readiness, infrastructure repair capacity, incident attribution and allied exercise performance.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE & LEGEND

01 / CRISIS LEVEL — CELL FORMAT SAMPLE

Stable	Tension	Elevated Crisis	Severe Crisis	Critical
Security situation broadly stable or contained.	Heightened tension or recurring incidents.	Active instability or significant escalation potential.	Sustained conflict or serious deterioration.	High-intensity crisis or major escalation with immediate implications.

Overall levels and trends follow the approved RCW review of 26 November. Sector ratings are independent WTAFM judgements. Grey = not assessed.

02 / TREND

↑ Worsening → Stable ↓ Improving – Not assessed

RCW trend is regional; sector trend compares the two weekly windows.

03 / PROBABILITY

Almost Certain	>90%
Highly Likely	75–90%
Likely	55–<75%
Possible	40–<55%
Plausible	25–<40%
Unlikely	10–<25%
Highly Unlikely	<10%

04 / ANALYTICAL CONFIDENCE

High / Moderate / Low Confidence. Reflects source quality, independence, corroboration, consistency and information gaps; distinct from probability.

05 / ACTIVITY LEVEL — WHEN QUANTIFIABLE

Very High	> +90%
High	> +70% to +90%
Elevated	> +20% to +70%
Moderate	–20% to +20%
Reduced	Reduction >20% to 70%
Low	Reduction >70%

Use only with a defined baseline, period and comparable data. Activity is not a crisis level.

06 / TIME HORIZON

Short Term	Up to 6 months
Near Term	>6–24 months
Mid Term	>24–60 months
Long Term	>60 months

Weekly forecast: 27 Nov–3 Dec 2026. Longer horizons must be stated explicitly.

07 / APPLICATION AND EVIDENCE

Probability concerns the principal forecast; confidence concerns evidence quality. Not assessed denotes insufficient evidence, not absence of activity.

08 / INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES

Azerbaijan Ministry of Defence • European Commission • European External Action Service (EEAS) • House of Commons Library (United Kingdom) • NATO Joint Warfare Centre • Poland Ministry of National Defence • Presidency of Azerbaijan • Prime Minister of Armenia • Taiwan Ministry of National Defense • U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) • UK Maritime Trade Operations / Joint Maritime Information Center (UKMTO/JMIC) • United Nations (including OCHA and UNIFIL).

Complete source and verification records are retained in the internal analytical archive.